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Getting Title VII Back on Track: Leaving Allison Behind
for the Robinson Line
I. INTRODUCTION
In Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company,1 the
Second Circuit created an important circuit split by departing from the
Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corporation.2 The
circuit split concerns the proper interpretation and impact of the 1991
Civil Rights Amendments on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”)
23. Two issues are at the heart of the split: (1) the availability of
compensatory and punitive damages in a Rule 23(b)(2) class action; and
(2) the power of federal courts to creatively sub-class, bifurcate, or
modify Title VII proceedings under Rule 23(c)(4). These legal
differences also have significant practical impacts because: (1) potential
plaintiffs are unable to rely upon the federal courts to enforce Title VII
civil rights claims; and (2) potential defendants are almost completely
relieved from the large monetary and public relations liabilities
concomitant with class action litigation.
This Comment argues that Robinson’s rejection of Allison’s unduly
stringent requirements places civil rights back on the right track and
provides the federal courts with a more judicially-manageable framework
for resolving the disputed issues. Robinson is the right legal track to
follow because it is more faithful to the text of Rule 23(b)(2) and the
advisory committee note. This fidelity results in a workable test allowing
courts to weigh the relative value of the requested monetary and
equitable relief. Enabled to objectively valuate the requested relief, the
Robinson test preserves judicial discretion to certify Rule 23(b)(2)
classes. The Robinson test also creates judicial economy and maintains
the doors of the federal judiciary open to adjudicate Title VII claims.
Given these important jurisprudential considerations, courts should
follow Robinson over Allison when faced with certification of a robust
Rule 23(b)(2) class seeking a full range of remedies.
Part II of this Comment examines the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
individual and class adjudication of Title VII litigation, the 1991 Civil
1. 267 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2001).
2. 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998).
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Rights Amendments, and the mechanics of Rule 23. Part III summarizes
the Allison opinion. Part IV examines the procedural history, facts, and
reasoning of Robinson in detail. Part V contrasts the two decisions and
provides a broad outline of the analytic and judicial considerations
favoring the Robinson track of analysis as better precedent. Part VI
analyzes in detail how the Robinson and Allison tests stack up to the text
of Rule 23 and the implications of their differing tests for monetary
predominance in certifying a Rule 23(b)(2) class. Part VII explores the
legitimacy of bifurcating Title VII class litigation and the conflicting
views of Robinson and Allison. Part VIII provides empirical evidence
that the Allison test is preventing effective enforcement of Title VII by
private litigation, suggesting that the Robinson test better reflects
congressional intent. Part IX briefly outlines the jurisprudential
considerations supporting the adoption of Robinson’s analysis and
concludes by urging courts to leave Allison behind and follow the
Robinson analytical track.
II. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS AND TITLE VII LITIGATION
A. The 1964 Civil Rights Act
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.3 The majority of Title VII enforcement is through private
litigation, and a significant number of those suits are class actions.4
Initially only injunctive, declarative, and equitable remedies were
available to victims of discrimination.5
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
4. See, e.g., Amchem. Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997) (“Civil rights cases
against parties charged with unlawful, class-based discrimination are prime examples” of the use of
Rule 23(b)(2).); Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int’l Inc., 195 F. 3d 894, 896 (7th Cir. 1999) (“For many years
Rule 23(b)(2) was the normal basis of certification in Title VII pattern-or-practice cases.”). The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) also has an enforcement role, but it brings far
fewer numbers of cases and is not subject to the constraints of Rule 23. See generally, General Tel.
Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318 (1980).
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2000). These remedies include
a commitment by the respondent to cease engaging in the unlawful discrimination; the
posting of notices alerting all respondent’s employees of their right to be free of
discrimination; corrective or preventive action designed to ensure that similar violations
will not recur; nondiscriminatory placement of each identified victim; expungement of
negative comments or adverse actions from employee’s records; back pay for each
identified victim; and attorney’s fees.
2 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, COMPLIANCE MANUAL, THEORIES OF
DISCRIMINATION VOLUME § 604, no. 915.002 (July 14, 1992). After some debate among the circuit
courts, front pay was an additional equitable remedy made available to Title VII discrimination
victims. Front pay takes the place of employee reinstatement when reinstatement is not possible due
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In order to qualify for relief, plaintiffs must prove either a disparate
impact or disparate treatment theory of discrimination. Disparate
treatment involves intentional discrimination by the employer.6 However,
due to the difficulty of proving an intentional motive, plaintiffs can also
show discrimination where similarly situated individuals receive
different treatment.7 Disparate treatment is proved when a member of a
protected group, who is qualified for a vacant position, is denied
employment and “the employer continue[s] thereafter to seek applicants
from persons of complainant’s qualifications.”8 Disparate impact results
from the use of a facially-neutral, non-intentional employment practice,
such as requiring a high school diploma, which nevertheless produces a
statistically significant and disproportionate effect on the protected
class.9
Alternatively, rather than pursuing a claim on an individual basis,
plaintiffs may seek to become class representatives and bring a Title VII
class action, generally known as a “pattern or practice” suit.10 This two
phase procedure was approved by the Supreme Court in International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States.11 “Pattern or practice” class
actions are certified under Rule 23(b)(2) and are tried first in a
preliminary liability phase. Only if discriminatory liability is found
during the liability phase does a remedial damages phase begin.12 During
the first, or liability, phase, plaintiff’s burden of proof must establish the
employer’s use of discrimination as a “standard operating procedure.”13
This burden is proved through the use of anecdotal (i.e., class
representative testimony) and statistical evidence (i.e., from the class as a
whole).14 If the employer is unable to rebut the evidence, the court will
conclude the existence of a discriminatory employment practice, order
class-wide injunctive and declaratory relief, and give a rebuttable
presumption of liability to each individual class member during the
second phase.15

to continued employee-employer hostility. See Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S.
843, 846 (2001).
6. McDonald Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
7. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
8. McDonald Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
9. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (overruled by statute on other grounds).
10. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 329.
11. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). For an explicit description of the two phases, see EEOC v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 960 F. Supp. 203, 205 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
12. Id. at 329.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 336-37.
15. Id. at 361.
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Phase two, the remedial stage, adjudicates individual damage claims,
such as back pay and reinstatement. During the remedial stage, plaintiffs
must prove they suffered an adverse employment action that resulted in
an economic loss.16 Defendant employers avoid individual liability only
if they can prove the adverse employment action was motivated by
“lawful reasons.”17
B. The 1991 Civil Rights Amendments
Congress passed the 1991 Civil Rights Amendments “to provide
appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination . . . and [expand] the
scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate
protection to victims of discrimination.”18 Congress maintained and
expanded civil rights in the 1991 amendments in a variety of ways. In
cases of intentional discrimination, Congress determined that both
compensatory and punitive damages were appropriate remedies.19
Congress also provided both parties with the right to trial by jury.20
Additionally, Congress legislatively overruled several earlier Supreme
Court decisions that severely limited the scope and application of Title
VII.21 These changes reflect continued congressional reliance upon
private litigation to enforce Title VII’s provisions.22 Specifically,
Congress assumed that class actions would continue to be certified after

16. Id. at 361-62.
17. Id. at 362.
18. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §3, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000). A “damage cap” was placed on the total amount of
compensatory and punitive damages available, based on the size of the employer and ranging from
$50,000 to $300,000. Id. § 1981a(b)(3).
20. Id. § 1981a(c).
21. The 1991 Act modified or overruled eight previous Supreme Court decisions. Section
101 responds to Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989). Section 105 responds
explicitly to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). Section 107 responds to Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). Section 108 responds to Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755
(1989). Section 109 responds to EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991). Section
112 responds to Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989). Section 113 responds to
W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991). Section 114 responds to Library of Congress
v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310 (1986). Significantly, the Teamsters opinion, setting forth the procedures for
Title VII pattern or practice suits, was not addressed by the Act. See Susan E. Stokes, et al., Title VII
Class Actions after Allison v. Citgo Petroleum, Inc. 19 ABA Annual 5 n.6 (1999), available at
http://www.bna.com/bnabooks/ ababna/annual/99/annual19.pdf. (demonstrating (1) statutory
language overriding the Wilks Court mirrored the language and structure of Rule 23; (2) committee
reports referencing successful class actions as a model for future enforcement; and (3) objections
that compensatory and punitive damages would now be available to class plaintiffs claiming
discrimination under the 1991 amendments).
22. The House Report for the 1991 Act provides that compensatory and punitive damages
were included to “encourage citizens to act as private attorneys general.” H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at
65 (1991).
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the 1991 amendments.23 Together, these changes demonstrate that the
1991 Act was intended to expand, not curtail or limit, the use of class
actions to enforce civil rights.24
C. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23—Class Actions
When one individual from a protected class has been discriminated
against, similar discrimination against other individuals from that same,
or another, protected class frequently occurs. Traditionally, Title VII
employment discrimination suits have been brought as employment class
actions under Rule 23. However, discrimination itself does not create a
presumption of class action suitability, and the proposed class must meet
the four universal elements required by Rule 23(a) and conform to at
least one of the four types of class actions created by Rule 23(b).25
Rule 23(a) requires that a proposed class satisfy the elements of
numerosity, typicality, commonality, and adequacy of representation.26
Rule 23(b) creates four types of class actions and a class must fulfill the
requirements of either Rule 23(b)(1), (b)(2) or (b)(3) before qualifying
for certification. A Rule 23(b)(1) “prejudice” class occurs when
resolving the dispute through individual litigation would result in a race
to the courthouse where the first case to be decided would effectively
decide all other subsequent lawsuits on the same matter.27 Similarly, a
Rule 23(b)(1) “limited fund” class generally occurs when the defendant
has insufficient assets to pay potential legal liabilities of all potential
plaintiffs.28 A Rule 23(b)(2) “injunctive” class allows certification where
plaintiffs suffer substantially the same injuries from defendants’
allegedly illegal treatment.29
A Rule 23(b)(3) “damage” class was created to allow certification of
negative value lawsuits that would otherwise never be adjudicated on an

23. See supra note 22.
24. See, e.g., Roger Clegg, A Brief Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 54 LA.
L. REV. 1459, 1459-71 (1994). Additionally, if the 1991 Congress had intended to change the then
current practice of certifying Title VII litigation under Rule 23(b)(2), it could have modified the
Teamsters decision at the same time as it modified the Wards Cove and Wilks decisions.
25. See Gen. Tel. Co. of S.W. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1). The text allows certification of a “prejudice” class where
separate, individual suits would create “inconsistent or varying adjudications . . . which would
establish incompatible standards of conduct” or when adjudications on the individual cases “would
as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the
adjudication.” Id.
28. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1).
29. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). The text allows certification of an “injunctive relief” class where
the defendant “has acted . . . on grounds generally applicable to the class,” and the plaintiffs seek
final injunctive or equitable relief that the court can impose “with respect to the class as a whole.” Id.
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individual basis.30 In the case of a negative value suit, the denial of class
certification usually spells the end of all litigation, both class and
individual.31 Unlike other classes, a Rule 23(b)(3) damage class requires
predominance32 and superiority33 elements in addition to notice & optout procedures34 before certification is proper. Alternatively, the
predominance and superiority requirements of a 23(b)(3) class can also
be met through certification of “issue-specific” classes dealing only with
issues common to the class as a whole and leaving non-common issues
for individual adjudication.35
The trial court makes the initial certification decision.36 Historically,
the trial court has broad discretion on the appropriateness of class
certification due to the fact specific nature of the inquiry.37 However,
Rule 23(f) now allows for appellate review immediately after the trial
court’s initial certification decision.38 On appeal, the denial of

30. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985)
(“Class actions . . . permit the plaintiffs to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate
individually.”). A negative value suit occurs when the value of a claim is too small to cover the
transaction costs associated with any “meaningful individual enforcement of even well-established,
meritorious claims.” Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and the Right to Opt Out of Class
Actions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1059 (2002).
31. See, e.g., Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1978) (recognizing that
the denial of class certification “may induce a plaintiff to abandon his individual claim”).
32. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). The predominance element requires the “questions of law or fact
common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members.” Id.
33. Id. The superiority element requires that a class action “is superior to other available
methods” of adjudicating the suit. Courts determine superiority by weighing the following four
factors: (1) “the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions”; (2) “the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy
already commenced by or against members of the class”; (3) “the desirability or undesirability of
concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum”; and (4) “the difficulties likely to
be encountered in the management of a class action.” Id. See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591, 618 (1997).
34. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). Notice and opt-out procedures are required in order to give
absent class members an opportunity to escape the res judicata effects of litigation under Rule
23(b)(3). Id. In contrast, neither a 23(b)(1) nor a 23(b)(2) class requires notice and opt-out
procedures because of the cohesive interest of the entire class in the litigation outcome. See Johnson
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 598 F.2d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1979); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)-(2).
However, if the cohesive interest falters, courts may order notice and opt-out procedures to protect
the due process rights of class members. Johnson, 598 F.2d at 438. See also Kyriazi v. W. Elec. Co.,
647 F.2d 388, 392-95 (3d Cir. 1981).
35. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4). The certification of an issue-specific class, as with all classes, is
further subject to the court’s power to modify or rescind the class certification if the class proves
unmanageable or if discovery creates additional issues that are best adjudicated on an individual
basis. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(4)
36. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1).
37. Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566, 570-72 (2d Cir. 1982).
38. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). Rule 23 was amended in 2000 to allow for appeals without the need
for a mandamus order or other procedure. Id.
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certification is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard due to the
highly factual nature of the court’s initial determination.39
III. ALLISON V. CITGO PETROLEUM CORP., AND THE 1991 CIVIL RIGHTS
AMENDMENTS
A. Facts
In Allison v. Citgo, over 130 named plaintiffs sought to become class
representatives on behalf of a putative class of more than one thousand
potential members.40 They brought suit pursuant to Title VII for
allegedly discriminatory employment practices related to hiring, training,
compensation and promotion policies.41 The district court denied class
certification and the Allison court affirmed the denial of class
certification in a 2-1 decision.42 In denying class certification, the Allison
court specifically noted, “Before the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1991 . . . aspects of this case clearly would have qualified for class
certification.”43
Applying the terms of the 1991 Act to the requirements of Rule 23,
the Allison court found that class certification was inappropriate under
23(b)(2), 23(b)(3), or a bifurcated 23(b)(2) liability phase with a 23(b)(3)
remedial phase trial because of three distinct problems: (1) the
inappropriate predominant nature of monetary remedies in a 23(b)(2)
class; (2) the superiority of individual trials to a 23(b)(3) class where
individualized monetary damages are sought; and (3) Seventh
Amendment concerns about the existence of common issues between the
equitable and legal claims.44
B. Allison’s Analysis45
Allison’s first problem with 23(b)(2) certification involved whether
the monetary relief requested was incidental or predominant. Noting that
the plain language of Rule 23(b)(2) is silent as to the availability of
monetary damages in a 23(b)(2) class, Allison turned to the advisory
committee notes on Rule 23 stating that a 23(b)(2) class “does not extend
39. Sirota, 673 F.2d at 570-72; Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468, 471-72 (5th Cir.
1986).
40. 151 F.3d 402, 407 (5th Cir. 1998).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 408-09. See infra discussion notes 59-61.
45. Rather than include an analysis of the dissenting opinion in Allison, relevant portions of
Judge Dennis’ dissent are brought up in Part IV and V to support the Robinson test.
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to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or
predominantly to money damages.”46 From this language, the court
presumed that monetary relief predominates in a 23(b)(2) class unless it
is “incidental to requested injunctive or declaratory relief.”47 The court
defined incidental monetary relief as “damages that flow directly from
liability to the class as a whole on the claims forming the basis of . . .
relief.”48 Further, incidental monetary relief (1) would be “capable of
computation by means of objective standards,” (2) would “not require
additional hearings to resolve the disparate merits of each individual’s
case,” or (3) “entail complex individualized determinations.”49 Applying
this test to the proposed class, the court determined that the
compensatory and punitive damages sought required “specific
individualized proof,” could not be “calculated by objective standards,”
and were “clearly . . . not incidental to class-wide injunctive or
declaratory relief.”50 In sum, the Allison court de facto precludes the
certification of nearly all (b)(2) classes that seek monetary relief.
The Allison court also found that the proposed class failed to meet
the superiority and predominance requirements for certification under
23(b)(3). The predominance test could not be met because the
compensatory and punitive damages claims, as discussed above, required
“individualized and independent proof of injury” in addition to “the
means by which discrimination was inflicted” regarding each class
member.51 This requirement, with a “focus almost entirely on facts and
issues specific to individuals rather than the class as a whole” would
destroy the efficiency of a class proceeding and turn it “into multiple
lawsuits separately tried.”52
Similarly, the superiority element could not be met because
“individual-specific issues” would decrease the efficiency of the class,
create “manageability problems” with a jury trial with thousands of
potential plaintiffs, and create the potential need for multiple juries
which could “introduc[e] potential Seventh Amendment problems.”53
Given the 1991 Act’s provision for monetary damages and attorney’s
fees, individuals already had sufficient incentive to file their own

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee notes.
Allison, 151 F.3d at 415.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 417.
Id. at 419.
Id.
Id. at 419-20.
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individual suits and did not need class certification to overcome the
possibility of a negative value suit.54
Finally, the Allison majority ruled that a bifurcated proceeding, with
a 23(b)(2) or 23(b)(3) class certified only for the liability phase would
either waste judicial resources or violate the right to jury trial provided
by the Seventh Amendment and the 1991 Act. The plaintiffs requested
certification “on the disparate impact claim and the first stage of the
pattern or practice claim.”55 The court rejected the requests for two
reasons. First, the court determined that certifying the pattern or practice
claim would not “increase the likelihood that latter certification of the
second stage . . . would be possible” and that without this the district
court lacked any grounds to certify the class.56 Second, Fifth Circuit
precedent prohibited an end-run around the predominance requirement of
23(b)(3) by temporarily “sever[ing] issues until the remaining common
issue predominates over the remaining individual issues” through the use
of Rule 23(c)(4).57
Having rejected certification of the pattern and practice claim, the
Allison court finally considered the possibility of partial class
certification for the adverse impact claim.58 However, this course was
rejected because the Allison court found that the right to a jury trial had
attached to the pattern or practice claim, and hence to “all factual issues
necessary to resolving that claim.”59 Therefore, because both claims
involved the existence of common factual issues, the certification of an
adverse impact class would result in factual issues being tried by the
court prior to a jury determination and would therefore run “afoul of the
Seventh Amendment.”60 The Allison court’s analysis dominated the
opinions of other federal courts and effectively foreclosed class
enforcement of Title VII until the Second Circuit’s rejection of Allison in
2001.61
54. Id. See supra text and discussion accompanying notes 30-31.
55. Allison, 151 F.3d at 420.
56. Id. at 421.
57. Id. at 422.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 423.
60. Id. at 425.
61. Three circuits have explicitly adopted the Allison (b)(2) test while a fourth is wavering.
Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int’l, Inc., 195 F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 1999) (adopting Allison’s (b)(2)
predominance test); Lemon v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 216 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2000) (reaffirming Allison’s (b)(2) test but allowing consideration of bifurcated proceedings); Barabin v.
Aramark Corp., 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 3532 (3d Cir. 2003) (adopting Allison’s (b)(2) test in Title
VII discrimination suit); Rutstein v. Avis Rent-a-Car Sys., Inc., 211 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2000)
(adopting Allison’s (b)(2) test in §1981 discrimination suit). But cf. Molski v. Gleich, 307 F.3d 1155
(9th Cir 2002), opinion withdrawn, Molski v. Gleich, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 2055 (9th Cir. Feb. 6,
2003). The following circuit courts have all followed the Allison (b)(2) test: Reap v. Cont’l Cas. Co.,
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IV. ROBINSON V. METRO NORTH COMMUTER RAILROAD
A. Facts and Procedural History
In 1997, twenty-five current and former employees of Metro-North
Commuter Railroad sought class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) of a
Title VII employment discrimination claim against their employer.62
They charged that Metro-North “engage[d] in company-wide
discriminatory practices,” i.e. a pattern or practice suit.63 The plaintiffs
were African-Americans seeking to certify a proposed class of “all
African-American employees of Metro-North Commuter Railroad from
1983 to 1996” who were either lower-management or unionized
workers.64 District Judge Rakoff denied the motion for class certification
after extensive discovery because plaintiffs “failed to carry their burden”
on “both the commonality and the typicality” elements of Rule 23(a).65
Subsequently, Judge Rakoff granted summary judgment dismissing
the claims of nine of the plaintiffs, leaving only four plaintiffs in the
suit.66 Class plaintiffs then appealed the denial of class certification and
the Second Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings.67
Judge Newman of the Second Circuit found that the district court, in its
denial of class certification, had committed a reversible error by
considering “the merits of the claims of the purported class,” which is
inappropriate at the certification stage.68 Judge Newman also found that
the plaintiffs had met the requirements of Rule 23(a) and ordered the
district court to consider the requirements of Rule 23(b) on remand.69
Upon remand, Judge Rakoff considered plaintiffs’ renewed motion
for class certification for trial on bifurcated liability and damages.70 The
court, relying primarily upon, and quoting extensively from, the Allison
decision, determined that 23(b)(2) certification was inappropriate
because of the need for “individualized proof and proceedings to
199 F.R.D. 536 (D.N.J. 2001); Ramirez v. DeCoster, 194 F.R.D. 348 (D. Me. 2000); Rineheart v.
Ciba-Geigy Corp., 183 F.R.D. 497 (M.D. La. 1998); Sibley v. Diversified Collection Svcs., Inc.,
1998 WL 355492 (N.D. Tex. June 30, 1998).
62. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 175 F.R.D. 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
63. Id. at 46-47.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 373, *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 15, 1998). The claims of the other initial plaintiffs were withdrawn prior to this judgment. Id. at
2 n.1.
67. Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 191 F.3d 283, 296 (2d Cir. 1999).
68. Id. at 293.
69. Id.
70. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 197 F.R.D. 85 (S.D.N.Y 2000).
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determine . . . what individualized damages were appropriate.”71 Such
individualized proceedings would “overwhelm” either the liability or
damages phase and “make class action treatment inappropriate under
Rule 23(b)(2).”72 For similar reasons, the court determined that 23(b)(3)
certification was not possible because “questions of fact affecting
individual members of the class” predominated over any common
questions.73 The superiority element also could not be met because of the
individual plaintiffs’ interest in controlling prosecution of the case,
doubts about the adequacy of the class representatives, the localized
nature of the dispute within New York, and the challenges of
“management of a class action” with highly individualized factors.74
Given these findings, the court dismissed the case with prejudice.75
B. Robinson Ruling Redux
On appeal for the second time, the Second Circuit, in a 3-0 decision,
vacated the district court’s order dismissing the case and ordered the
court to certify a disparate impact class under 23(b)(2).76 The panel also
ordered the district court to consider whether the pattern or practice
claim should be certified as a 23(b)(2) class or bifurcated to allow
certification of the liability stage of the pattern or practice claim.77 The
Second Circuit reached this decision after deciding that the trial court
had abused its discretion by applying the wrong legal test in determining
the appropriateness of class certification.78 Chief Judge Walker held that
the Allison “incidental” test was the incorrect legal standard to apply, that
the refusal to bifurcate the pattern or practice claim was an abuse of
discretion, that a disparate impact class would not violate the Seventh
Amendment, and that consideration of class plaintiffs’ adequacy as
representatives was inappropriate.79
1. Incidental test
In a case of first instance in the Second Circuit, the Robinson panel
refused to adopt the Allison “incidental” test for determining the

71. Id. at 88.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 89.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 90.
76. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R Co., 267 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2001).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 167.
79. Id. The first three holdings are discussed in detail in this Comment, while the adequacy of
the plaintiff class is outside the scope of this Comment.
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feasibility of certifying a 23(b)(2) class that seeks monetary, in addition
to equitable, relief.80 The court held that the Allison “incidental” test
effectively “forecloses 23(b)(2) class certification of all claims that
include compensatory damages (or punitive damages).”81 Rather than
adopt this “bright-line bar to 23(b)(2) class treatment of all claims” for
monetary damages, the Robinson court created an “ad hoc” or
“balancing” test to determine the appropriateness of 23(b)(2)
certification.82
The balancing test essentially adopted the holding of the Allison
dissent, that the totality of the remedies sought should be weighed,
considering whether “the positive weight or value [to plaintiffs] of the
injunctive or declaratory relief sought is predominant” and whether
“class treatment would be efficient and manageable, thereby achieving
an appreciable measure of judicial economy.”83 However, the Robinson
court added two additional elements for plaintiffs to meet in order to
certify a mixed remedy 23(b)(2) class. First, “reasonable plaintiffs would
bring the suit to obtain the injunctive or declaratory relief sought.”84
Second, “the injunctive or declaratory relief sought would be both
reasonably necessary and appropriate were the plaintiffs to succeed on
the merits.”These two requirements effectively ferret out “sham requests
for injunctive relief” that predominantly seek monetary relief.85
The court reasoned that a balancing approach was preferable to the
bright-line Allison prohibition because it restores district court discretion,
achieves greater judicial efficiency, and “ensur[es] due process for absent
class members.”86 First, Rule 23 vests the decision of whether to grant or
deny class certification in the district court.87 The Second Circuit, turning
to precedent and the leading treatise on class actions, was persuaded that
“[n]o clear standards have been or could be developed” in light of
legislatively granted judicial discretion.88 Second, judicial efficiency is
better served by “permitting district courts to assess issues . . . on a caseby-case basis . . . [rather than] the one-size-fits all approach of the
[Allison] incidental damages standard.”89 Third, the due process concerns
80. Id. at 164.
81. Id. at 163.
82. Id. at 164.
83. Id. (quoting Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 430 (5th Cir. 1998) (Dennis
J., dissenting)).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 165.
87. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
88. Robinson, 267 F.3d at 165. (quoting 1 HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG
ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4.14 at 48-49 (3d 1992)).
89. Id.
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that led the Allison court to adopt a bright-line prohibition are absent
when “the district court simply afford[s] notice and opt out rights to
absent class members . . . for the damages phase of the proceedings.”90 In
the absence of due process concerns, the Robinson court held that “the
interests of the class members [remain] essentially identical” and are
“ensured by adequate representation alone” at the liability phase of class
proceedings, and thus and make 23(b)(2) certification appropriate.91
2. Bifurcated proceedings
Next, the Robinson panel considered the district court’s denial of
class certification of a liability phase only pattern or practice claim. In
finding that the district court erred in not certifying a liability class, the
Robinson court turned to Rule 23(c)(4), which allows “an action [to] be
brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular
issues.”92 This Rule has been interpreted to mean that the use of
bifurcated trials should be maximized in district courts in order to
conserve “judicial resources.”93 The court agreed with commentators that
“class action[s] should not be found unmanageable without exploring . . .
bifurcating liability and damages.”94 The court found that a liability-only
class would “promote judicial economy” and decrease the “range of
issues in dispute” because it would establish whether the plaintiffs’ class
should receive prospective relief, a presumption of liability for each
individual employee, and whether or not a damages phase would even be
needed.95
3. Seventh Amendment issues96
The Robinson court also ordered the district court to certify a
disparate impact 23(b)(2) class. The district court had not done so
because of potential problems with the Seventh Amendment that could

90. Id. at 166.
91. Id. at 166 n.10.
92. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4).
93. Cent. Wesleyan Coll. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 6 F.3d 177, 185 (4th Cir. 1993).
94. Robinson, 267 F.3d at 168 (quoting Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions and Duplicative
Litigation, 62 IND. L.J. 507, 516 (1987)).
95. Id. The court also corrected the district court’s misunderstanding regarding the role of
anecdotal evidence as “texture” to the “statistical evidence directed at establishing an overall pattern
or practice of intentional discrimination.” Id. at 168.
96. While the Seventh Amendment problem is discussed here as an important part of the
Robinson decision, it will not be analyzed as it is out of the scope of this Comment. The Seventh
Amendment problem deals primarily with procedural problems arising from certifying a disparate
impact class. This paper focuses solely upon the appropriateness of bringing a pattern or practice
discrimination claim under Rule 23(b)(2) and/or 23(b)(3).
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arise if the disparate impact claim were tried first. However, the
Robinson court noted that this problem was obviated by plaintiffs’
“opportunity to proceed to a jury trial first on the liability phase of the
pattern-or-practice claim.”97 If the plaintiffs were successful, the
disparate impact trial could be delayed until after the remedial phase of
the pattern or practice claim, thereby preventing “any overlapping factual
issues between the two claims” because they would have been first tried
by the pattern or practice jury.98 Alternatively, if defendants were
successful after the liability phase, the disparate impact judge could rely
upon “answers to special interrogatories from the pattern or practice jury
for any overlapping common factual issues.”99
V. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: WHY ROBINSON IS A BETTER LINE OF
LEGAL REASONING TO FOLLOW THAN ALLISON
While circuit court splits initially create confusion about the state of
the law, the Robinson court’s rejection of Allison actually clears up a
substantial amount of confusion caused by the Allison decision. The
Allison court’s “incidental” bright-line test of monetary predominance in
a Rule 23(b)(2) action has two fundamental flaws. First, it
misapprehends both the purpose and text of 23(b)(2). Second, it
impermissibly usurps the trial court’s legislatively vested discretion in
making class certification decisions. Robinson corrects the confusion
caused by these two errors by creating a balancing test that adheres
closely to the purposes of Rule 23(b)(2) actions and preserves the role of
the trial court in evaluating class certification motions.
Allison created further judicial confusion by refusing to bifurcate the
proceedings and certify a liability-only class under Rule 23(b)(2) or
23(b)(3). Analytically, the Allison court’s decision denying bifurcation
was based upon an overly broad reading of Castano v. American
Tobacco Co.,100 a complete misreading of Cooper v. Federal Reserve
Bank of Richmond,101 and the unnecessary implication of only potential
Seventh Amendment and due process concerns. Robinson corrects this
by pointing out how proper use of Rule 23(c)(4) can be used to bifurcate
class issues and achieve judicial economy.102
Additionally, Allison condemned the judiciary to adjudicate all Title
VII claims seeking monetary damages by individual trials. Practically,
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Robinson, 267 F.3d at 170.
Id.
Id.
84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
467 U.S. 867 (1984). See infra notes 188-93.
Robinson, 267 F.3d at 167-69.
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the requirement of individual non-class adjudication effectively denies
Title VII plaintiffs access to the federal court system designed to protect
their rights and eviscerates civil rights enforcement. Despite the
availability of compensatory and punitive damages, individual plaintiffs
still face the negative value dilemma. This result is clearly at odds with
the express intent of Congress when it passed the 1991 Act to expand
and increase the scope of remedies available to discrimination victims.
Robinson corrects this by actively engaging Allison’s potential
constitutional problems and avoiding them by using existing procedures
and crafting new procedures. Robinson’s analysis safeguards
constitutional rights without sacrificing effective civil rights
enforcement.
VI. SUPERIORITY OF ROBINSON’S RULE 23(B)(2) BALANCING TEST VS.
ALLISON’S BRIGHT LINE RULE
The Robinson court adopted an “ad hoc” or balancing test for the
Second Circuit rather than adopting the Allison court’s bright-line test to
decide whether monetary relief predominates in a 23(b)(2) class.103 The
balancing approach is superior to a bright-line test for several reasons.
First, it adheres to the unambiguous plain meaning established by the text
of Rule 23(b)(2) which Allison ignores. Second, the advisory committee
note on Rule 23(b)(2) clearly calls for a relationship test that weighs the
requested injunctive or declarative relief with the requested monetary
relief. Allison abandons the committee’s call in favor of a test that
evaluates the procedures required to adjudicate and order the relief
requested. In contrast, Robinson confronts the committee note’s task
directly and creates a balancing test to weight the relationship between
the monetary and injunctive or declarative relief requested. Third, the
Allison test for the predominance of monetary relief in a Rule 23(b)(2)
suit attempts to re-write the (b)(2) class in the image of Rule 23(b)(3).
Allison thereby effectively creates a “monetary damages” firewall that
protects litigant’s due process rights while simultaneously denying these
same litigants the opportunity to bring their Title VII claims in a Rule
23(b)(2) class. In contrast, the Robinson test, by focusing on the textual
requirements of the Rule, recognizes that existing Rule 23 procedures
effectively ensure due process without creating an overly broad test.
Finally, the Robinson test preserves judicial discretion over class
certification. In contrast, Allison creates an extra-textual test that
effectively strips district courts of their discretion to certify a Rule
23(b)(2) class that seeks monetary damages provided for by the 1991
103. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 162-64 (2d Cir. 2001).
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amendments. These four considerations indicate that the Robinson
court’s balancing test is a superior indication of when a Rule 23(b)(2)
class seeking a full range of Title VII remedies should be certified.
A. Rule 23(b)(2)’s Minimal Textual Requirements and Plain Meaning
The text of Rule 23(b)(2) establishes a two-prong test for
certification. The first prong requires that the defendant “has acted . . . on
grounds generally applicable to the class.” 104 The second prong requires
that plaintiffs seek “final injunctive or equitable relief with respect to the
class as a whole.”105 The first prong is met when an employment practice
allegedly discriminates in a manner “generally applicable to the class.”106
The second prong is met when the putative class files for final injunctive
or declaratory relief from the employment practice on behalf of “the
class as a whole.”107
When these two elements have been met, certification should be
granted because neither the text nor its plain meaning establish any
further criteria. As a matter of construction, where the text of a statute or
rule is unambiguous, the text and plain meaning of the text should be
controlling without resorting to extra-textual sources, such as the
advisory committee notes, in order to divine legislative intent.108
Therefore, any class that can meet the textual requirements of Rule
23(b)(2) should be entitled to at least a presumption of legitimacy.
However, most courts have eschewed this approach, finding the text of
the Rule ambiguous, and relying upon the 1966 advisory committee note
on Rule 23(b)(2) for guidance.109

104. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See generally, Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
109. While reliance upon the advisory committee note is well established in precedent, its
necessity is questionable in the current case. Within the context of the Rule, a strong argument can
be made that a prospective class that properly meets the two textual requirements of 23(b)(2)is not a
“sham” suit and should be certified. In order to achieve 23(b)(2) certification, the injunctive or
declaratory relief must be “final” and “settle the legality” of the action or failure to act. These
requirements alone might be ruled sufficient, without any need to delve into what “predominant”
means. An exact definition might not be necessary because without the injunctive or declaratory
relief, no class is possible. If an action contains a sine qua non, such as injunctive or declaratory
relief, this relief obviously predominates over any other type of relief sought. As a matter of
interpretation, where the text of a statute or rule is unambiguous, the plain language and meaning of
the text should be controlling without resorting to legislative history in order to divine legislative
intent. See generally id. Here, because the text of the rule is silent regarding whether or not other
forms of relief, in addition to injunctive or declaratory, are available to a 23(b)(2) class, their
inclusion should not be read so as to change the explicit textual requirements for certification.
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B. Advisory Committee Notes: The Scope of Rule 23(b)(2)
The 23(b)(2) class was specifically created in order to allow the
adjudication of civil rights class actions under Title VII.110 This
consideration should shape how both the text of the Rule and the
advisory committee note for the Rule are interpreted. The advisory
committee note for Rule 23(b)(2) contains one statement that supports
the clear meaning of the text and one statement that purports to add an
additional element for class certification under the Rule. The note first
states:
This subdivision is intended to reach situations where a party has taken
action or refused to take action with respect to a class, and final relief
of an injunctive nature or of a corresponding declaratory nature, settling
the legality of the behavior with respect to the class as a whole, is
appropriate.111

This initial comment by the 1966 advisory committee mirrors the
text of Rule 23(b)(2) and makes it abundantly clear that courts should
focus on whether the injunctive or declaratory relief requested “settl[es]
the legality of the [employment practice] with respect to the class.”112
The note indicates that any test should also focus on whether the
injunctive or declaratory relief requested will force or prevent “action,”
in this case the discriminatory employment practice, with respect “to the
class,” not to each individual member of the class.113 If the above quote
were the only language in the note then the matter would be decided
based on the two textual requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) alone. This would
exclude the inclusion of monetary damages as a relevant factor in
determining class certification.
However, the advisory committee note also states that 23(b)(2)
classes do “not extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief
relates exclusively or predominantly to money damages.”114 The exact
meaning of this phrase is the focus of the split between the Allison and
Robinson courts. As discussed above, the Allison test concludes that only
“incidental” monetary damage claims will not predominate in a 23(b)(2)
class.115 In contrast, the Robinson court ruled that monetary damage

110. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee note; 2-14A MOORE’S MANUAL –
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, §14A.32 (“Rule 23(b)(2) was promulgated essentially as a
tool for facilitating civil rights actions.”).
111. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee note.
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 417 (5th Cir. 1998).
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claims are appropriate in a 23(b)(2) class as long as they do not
predominate over the requested injunctive or declaratory relief.116
The text of the committee note itself does not resolve the
Allison/Robinson split. However, it does provide clear guidance from
which to evaluate the two courts’ distinct tests. The comment selfdefines appropriate final relief as being of “an injunctive nature or . . .
declaratory nature.”117 Similarly, the “exclusively” language is selfdefining because the Rule’s text requires that a prospective 23(b)(2) class
must be seeking appropriate injunctive or declaratory relief. In plain
meaning, an action “exclusive[ly]” seeking money damages would not
allow for the inclusion of any other remedy, i.e., the necessary injunction
or declaration. The inclusion of “exclusive” therefore serves as an
indicator that “sham” or pre-textual claims for injunctive or declaratory
relief will not make money damage claims appropriate for 23(b)(2)
certification.118
However, this understanding does not answer the question of
whether money damages may be sought concurrently with appropriate
claims for injunctive or declaratory relief. However, the note does
indicate that the proper test to determine if money damages predominate
is how they “relate[]” to “appropriate” injunctive or declaratory relief.119
Given the inclusion of the unnecessary “exclusively” language, the
committee note clearly asks judges to decide whether the relationship
between the injunctive or declaratory “appropriate final relief” and the
requested money damages relief is legitimate or whether money damages
are sought as the predominant form of “final relief” requested.120
Because the committee note does not define “predominantly,” the next
section compiles definitions of “predominant” in an attempt to clarify the
permissible amount of monetary damage claims that would not
predominate in a Rule 23(b)(2) class.
C. Predominant Money Damages: A Relationship Test Comparing Relief
or Relief Procedures?
The Allison and Robinson courts each define “predominant”
differently. The Allison court focuses upon the procedures required for a
court to order the requested monetary relief vis-à-vis injunctive or
declaratory relief. The Robinson court’s definition of predominance
directly compares the types of relief requested. A large variety of
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 162-64 (2d Cir. 2001).
Id.
See In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1008 (3d Cir. 1986).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee note.
Id.
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definitions of “predominant” exist. Therefore, before analyzing the word,
the following admonition by Justice Douglas is relevant:
[I]n the English language, each word may have several meanings.
Often it is the use of a specific word or term upon which a case or
controversy may hinge. Only by using precise language can the waters
remain clear and unmuddied allowing justice to take its course
unfettered by those who would mislead or misrepresent.121

Justice Douglas’ quote highlights the high stakes involved in defining
when “the appropriate final relief relates . . . predominantly to money
damages.”122 Regardless of which test eventually wins out, the lack of a
specific definition in the mean time has already hindered the course of
justice in deterring discrimination.
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language defines
predominant as “[h]aving greatest ascendancy, importance, influence,
authority, or force.”123 This influence “often implies being uppermost at a
particular time.”124 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines
predominant as “being most frequent or common.”125 Predominant
monetary damages must therefore be the most important, the most
influential, the most frequent or common, or most often requested relief.
The Allison test appears to favor a “most infludential” definition,
where the “particular time” used to define this influence is at the
damages phase of a prospective class’s adjudication.126 Under this
understanding of “predominant,” the determination of compensatory
damages for each individual involves the most frequent, common or
numerous relief in the sense of total time necessary to adjudicate the
claims.127 It also makes the individualized claims for monetary damages
the most quantitatively numerous in comparison with the single claim for
class injunctive and/or declaratory relief.128 Therefore, this definition of
predominance focuses upon the procedures necessary for relief to be
granted.
In contrast, the Robinson test appears to favor a qualitative “most
influential” test, where two “particular times” are weighed to determine
the predominance of any monetary claims. The first time is the plaintiffs’
121. William O. Douglas, Foreward to WILLIAM C. BURTONS, BURTON’S LEGAL THESAURUS
vi (3d ed. 1998).
122. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee note. See also supra note 46.
123. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1383 (4th ed. 2000)
(emphasis added).
124. Id. at 534 (emphasis added).
125. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 918 (10th ed. 1993).
126. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998).
127. Id. at 419.
128. Id. at 415-19.
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initial decision to pursue both injunctive or declaratory and monetary
damages. This test weighs both the comparative “values” of the relief
sought and whether the suit would be brought in the absence of monetary
damages.129 The second time is at the granting of any final relief, where
the “injunctive or declaratory relief sought would be both reasonably
necessary and appropriate” in the event of a finding for plaintiffs.130 This
definition of predominance focuses upon the relief itself rather than
procedural issues or how evidence would be proven in court.
Both the Allison and Robinson interpretations of predominant are
reasonable in light of the multiplicity of definitions. As Allison noted,
“[H]ow [the definition] translates into a workable formula for
comparing . . . [predominance] is not at all clear.”131 However, each
court’s relative reliance, or lack thereof, on the advisory committee note
signals how these two tests, each of which purports to define
predominant, could reach such significant and substantially different
results. The Allison court stated “[t]he Advisory Committee Notes [sic]
make no effort to define or explain” predominantly.132 Instead, they
looked for guidance from “the principles and assumptions underlying the
23(b)(2) class and class actions in general.”133 The Allison court thus
missed the subtle, yet explicit, contextual direction key to defining
predominantly provided in the advisory committee note.
As discussed briefly above134, the advisory committee note directs
courts to focus on the relief requested and whether the relationship
between the injunctive relief requested and claims for money damages is
predominantly monetary.135 Earlier, the advisory committee note
highlighted that “relief of an injunctive or . . . declaratory nature” was
appropriate, if not absolutely necessary, in a 23(b)(2) action.136 Together,
this language indicates that the nature of the relief requested, vis-à-vis
money damages, should be weighed in order to determine whether the
money damages are more predominant than the injunctive or declaratory
relief that is properly available in a 23(b)(2) action.
The result of Allison’s omission is a focus on the procedures for, and
the potential difficulties of, awarding monetary relief to a 23(b)(2) class
rather than the monetary relief’s relationship to the requested injunctive
or declaratory relief. The Allison test is a de facto determination of
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 2001).
Id.
Allison, 151 F.3d at 412.
Id. at 411.
Id.
See supra notes 118-121.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee note.
Id.
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whether the injunctive or monetary claims would predominate the
court’s time. However, the advisory committee note does not give any
indication that the relationship between the court’s time and the
requested monetary relief is the crucial factor in determining
predominance. Further, the amount of time it will take during trial to
establish any given claim for relief should not be dispositive of whether
that claim will be certified under 23(b)(2). The contrary position is
tantamount to saying that only claims or defenses that can be made
within a single day, or even a single hour, are properly brought before
the courts. Such a suggestion is preposterous on its face.137
In contrast, the Robinson court’s predominance balancing test
adheres to the text of the advisory committee note and its call for a
relationship test. While Robinson does not make a “relief” versus “relief
procedures” distinction explicitly, it does create a relationship test
comparing the requested injunctive and declaratory relief against the
requested monetary relief. This makes the Robinson interpretation of the
advisory committee’s predominance test relatively simple: Does the
amount of requested monetary relief predominate the sum of the relief
requested when compared to the value of the requested injunctive or
declaratory relief? Therefore, by quantifying the value of injunctive or
declarative relief requested, the courts have an objective measure of
whether plaintiffs’ relief is mostly monetary or equitable in nature.138 If
the total amount of monetary damages sought is greater than the value of
equitable relief, then class certification is inappropriate under Rule
23(b)(2) and should instead be sought under Rule 23(b)(3). If however
the monetary damages are less than the equitable value, the suit may
proceed as a Rule 23(b)(2) class. Therefore, the Robinson test not only
arrives at a better textual interpretation of “predominance,” but also one
that can readily be adjudicated by the courts.
D. The Robinson Test Provides a Better Fit in Comparison to the Over137. But cf. MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1982)
(affirming a twenty-six day limit on both sides for the presentation of their case in chief).
138. Quantifying injunctive and declaratory relief will not present the courts with an unduly
difficult task. Courts already routinely quantify equitable relief when determining whether the
amount in controversy has been met for diversity jurisdiction purposes under 28 U.S.C. §1332. See
Mass. State Pharm. Ass’n v. Federal Prescrip. Serv., 431 F.2d 130, 132 (8th Cir. 1970) (injunctive
relief action filed originally in federal court). While there is an active debate over the correct
perspective from which to valuate equitable relief in individual suits, there is no debate about the
capacity of courts to engage in this equitable valuation analysis. 15 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL.,
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE— CIVIL §102.109 (2001). Further, in the class action context the
courts all appear to agree that the plaintiff’s perspective is required. See generally Snyder v. Harris,
394 U.S. 332, 338 (1969); Packard v. Provident Nat’l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1050 (3d Cir. 1993);
Snow v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir. 1977); 15 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL.,
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE— CIVIL §102.109 (2001).
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Inclusive Nature of the Allison Test
The Allison test denies 23(b)(2) certification to any claim for relief
that does not “flow directly from liability to the class as a whole on the
claims forming the basis of the injunctive or declaratory relief.”139 This
result is over inclusive in both form and substance.
First, neither the text nor the plain meaning of the advisory
committee note on predominance rules out a 23(b)(2) class that seeks
monetary relief that is secondary or dependent to injunctive or
declarative relief. Further, monetary damages are permissible even if
significant in comparison to injunctive or declarative relief. This
possibility exists because the text of Rule 23(b)(2), on its face, does not
require that monetary damages be exclusively incidental or nominal in
nature. If the Allison court disagreed with the plain language of the text
of Rule 23(b)(2), it should have noted its dislike and let the parties
injured by the language seek a congressional amendment rather than
replacing the text with its own interpretation. In contrast, the Robinson
court created a test that allows litigants to seek appropriate monetary
damages.
Second, the Allison standard is overly stringent and fails to achieve
judicial economy. To twist the Allison court’s own language, the test is
over-inclusive because it de facto denies 23(b)(2) certification to all
classes that seek monetary damages. However, this bright-line rule
denies litigants the capacity to exercise their statutory rights to
“compensatory and punitive damages as well as a jury trial” under the
1991 Civil Rights Act.140 This bar is especially repugnant where, as the
Allison court openly admitted, previous to 1991 these classes “clearly
would have qualified for class certification.”141 In contrast, the Robinson
court found a less restrictive means of protecting litigant procedural
rights without denying litigants their statutory and civil rights.
The Robinson court arrived at a workable test by not looking beyond
the textual mark of the advisory committee note and Rule 23. Robinson
avoided Allison’s mistaken assumption that the advisory committee note
was silent regarding the form for a predominance test of money
damages.142 This mistake led the Allison court to create an incidental test
of monetary predominance. However, on its face, it is far from clear that
the three words “incidental,” “predominant,” and “exclusive” create
either a complete or even an appropriate spectrum for comparing

139.
140.
141.
142.

Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998).
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000).
Allison, 151 F.3d at 407.
Id. at 411.
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monetary damages against injunctive or declaratory relief in a 23(b)(2)
class.143
An examination of the plain meaning of “incidental,” compared with
the definitions of “predominant” examined above, shows that these two
words are not sufficiently opposed to each other to create a boundary
between impermissible and appropriate relief in a 23(b)(2) action. While
“incidental” and “predominant” do not conflict with each other, nonincidental monetary damages are not necessarily predominant. Nonincidental monetary relief would not lack effect or influence, but could
be of either controlling or non-controlling, or in either a numerically
superior or inferior position in relation to injunctive or declaratory relief.
The failure of these two terms to meet indicates that an incidental test for
monetary damages will be over inclusive, excluding non-incidental
claims for monetary relief that have an effect, but a non-controlling one,
and are thus not predominant.
In contrast, the Robinson balancing test focuses on the “weight or
value” to plaintiffs of the injunctive relief sought in comparison to the
weight or value of the compensatory damages.144 This assessment
determines if the plaintiffs will focus primarily upon proving their
monetary damages to the exclusion or detriment of the injunctive or
declarative relief. A court therefore asks whether “reasonable plaintiffs”
would seek the requested injunctive or declaratory relief as a stand alone
remedy. This question is in turn answered by whether the relief is “both
reasonably necessary and appropriate.”145 In contrast to the “incidental”
test, the balancing test does not automatically exclude non-incidental,
non-predominate monetary relief. The balancing test does allow the court
sufficient discretion to determine whether the monetary relief sought
fails a plain meaning test of predominance. In sum, the case by case
balancing test advocated by the Robinson court is a closer fit to the text
and plain language of Rule 23 and the advisory committee note than the
linguistically over-inclusive “incidental” Allison test.

143. Black’s Law Dictionary defines incidental as “subordinate to something of greater
importance; having a minor role.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 765 (7th ed. 1999).” In the law of
damages, incidental means “losses reasonably associated with or related to actual damages.” Id. at
395. Webster’s Dictionary defines incidental as “occurring merely by chance or without intention or
calculation” or “lacking effect, force, or consequence: not receiving much consideration or
intention.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE,
UNABRIDGED 1142 (3d 1998). Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines predominant as “to
hold advantage in numbers or quantity” or “to exert controlling power or influence.” MERRIAMWEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 918 (10th ed. 1993).
144. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting
Allison, 151 F.3d at 430).
145. Id.
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E. Procedural Rights and Judicial Economy in a 23(b)(2) Class
The Robinson test protects the procedural rights of litigants and
promotes judicial economy by leaving discretion in the hands of the trial
judge, rather than imposing the Allison test’s unnecessary, inefficient,
and activist “incidental” test. Courts should follow the Robinson line of
reasoning because it better protects the due process rights of litigants and
promotes judicial economy.
1. Notice and opt-out procedures adequately safeguard due process
rights
The Allison court’s definition of predominance avoids two problems
it found in the procedure of awarding money damages to a 23(b)(2) class.
First, because 23(b)(2) actions are binding on all class members, the
Allison court defined predominance to include any monetary claim
suggesting, “the procedural safeguards of notice and opt-out are
necessary.”146 The court was persuaded that monetary damage claims
would decrease the presumption of cohesiveness in a 23(b)(2) class.
Therefore class notice and opt-out procedures, like those required in a
23(b)(3) class, would be necessary to protect “the individual rights of
class members.”147
In contrast, the Robinson court, while acknowledging the procedural
concerns of Allison, noted that other options existed to “eradicate the due
process risks posed” by 23(b)(2) monetary damage claims.148 One option
involves adjudication of whether the presumption of class cohesiveness
in the injunctive or declaratory relief sought has been compromised and
overcome by the individual interest in monetary damages. This option
properly recognizes that the adequacy of representation requirement of
Rule 23(a) ensures the due process rights of litigants “where the interests
of the class members are essentially identical.”149 During the initial phase
of a pattern of practice claim, the presumption of cohesiveness remains
because the interest of class members is in obtaining the desired
injunctive or declaratory relief.150 Here, the Robinson court appropriately
discerns that any disparity in class interests due to monetary damages
will not arise until after a ruling on the merits of the liability phase of the
trial.

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Allison, 151 F.3d at 413.
Id.
Robinson, 267 F.3d at 165 (emphasis added).
Id. at 166 n.10.
See id. at 166.
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Another option invokes the court’s power to “require that an opt-out
right and notice” be given to class members under Rule 23(d)(2) when
and if class cohesiveness fails.151 While notice and opt-out rights are only
required in a 23(b)(3) class, Rule 23(d)(2) allows the court discretion to
order such procedural safeguards sua sponte, if necessary, during the
course of any 23(b)(1), 23(b)(2) or 23(b)(3) proceeding. Also, while not
specifically noted by the Robinson court during its analysis, a balancing
test is also supported by the power of the court to modify or decertify a
class during the course of proceedings if the class fails to maintain the
requirements for certification, for example, adequacy of representation,
under Rule 23(d).
In sum, while the Allison “incidental” test does protect the
procedural rights of litigants, its reach erects more protection than is
needed. In fact, Allison may actually infringe on the substantive rights of
legitimate 23(b)(2) classes that seek a full range of Title VII remedies in
federal court. At best, this flaw detracts substantially from its superiority
as a test for predominance. At worst, it sacrifices substantive civil rights
in the name of protecting against avoidable procedural phantoms. The
strict Allison test is unnecessary to protect the constitutional due process
rights of litigants. The Robinson test recognizes the court’s discretionary
23(d)(2) power to order notice and opt-out procedures for class members
that ensure litigants their due process rights. This consideration alone
favors adoption of the Robinson balancing test because it adequately
protects the procedural and substantive rights of all litigants while
simultaneously allowing plaintiffs to prosecute Title VII claims in
defense of their civil rights.
2. Judicial economy and discretion
The second concern of the Allison court centered on the lack of
23(b)(3) predominance or superiority tests in 23(b)(2) actions, which it
felt were necessary to protect judicial economy. The Allison court found
that any 23(b)(2) predominance test must “achieve a significant measure
of judicial economy,” which could best be promoted by “concentrating
the litigation on common questions of law and fact.”152 In effect, this
holding meant that the Allison court’s “incidental” 23(b)(2)
predominance test would “serve essentially the same functions as the . . .
efficiency and manageability standards mandated in 23(b)(3) class
actions,” i.e., the requirements for superiority and predominance of

151. Id. (quoting Holmes v. Cont’l Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1154-55 (11th Cir. 1983)).
152. Allison, 151 F.3d at 414.
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common questions.153 With this understanding, the Allison court’s test
focuses on the amount of time it would take to adjudicate the claims for
relief requested by the prospective 23(b)(2) class.
However, the Robinson test better protects judicial economy and
discretion, and creates an adequate test of monetary predominance
without re-writing Rule 23(b)(2) as a 23(b)(3) class. The over inclusive
reach of the “incidental” test is ill-suited for making class certification
decisions. A bright-line test imposed by a circuit court panel is inflexible
and unable to account for the factual differences in each case that are a
hallmark of the common law system. The Robinson court correctly
concluded that a “case-by-case basis” was superior to the “one-size-fitsall,” bright-line “incidental” test.154
This conclusion is supported by the second consideration, judicial
discretion. Historically, trial judges have been given broad discretion in
whether or not to certify class actions.155 One leading commentator has
noted that “the trial court has broad discretion in determining whether the
action may be maintained as a class action and its determination should
be given great respect by a reviewing court.”156 The leading treatise on
class actions states that “no clear standards have been or could be
developed . . . in this area so pregnant with judicial discretion.”157 Both
of these texts suggest that the adoption of a bright-line test for
determining whether or not the requirements for class certification have
been met is entirely inappropriate. Any such test “nullifies the district
court’s legislatively granted . . . discretion.”158 It would also negate “the
district court’s inherent power to manage and control pending
litigation.”159
The Allison “incidental” test is subject to all of these criticisms
because it was created from the court’s consideration of “the principles
and assumptions underlying the 23(b)(2) class and class actions in
general.”160 It is precisely the “principles and assumptions” of Rule 23
and 23(b)(2) requirements that courts have discretion to decide upon in
light of the facts on a case by case basis. The Allison test dictates the
result on the principal of class cohesiveness embodied in the adequacy
153. Id. at 414-15.
154. Robinson, 267 F.3d at 164-65.
155. Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566, 570-72 (2d Cir. 1982).
156. 3 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 23.50 at 1104-05 (3d ed.
1974).
157. 1 HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4.14 at 48-49
(3d ed. 1992).
158. Allison, 151 F.3d at 430 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 408.
160. Id. at 412.
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requirement of 23(a) and the lack of judicial economy in a class seeking
non-incidental monetary relief in a 23(b)(2) class. The Allison court’s
concerns are therefore better met by the Robinson test, which leaves the
factual determination of whether the predomination test has been met to
the district court. Similarly, the Robinson test allows courts to determine
for themselves the questions of class representation adequacy and
whether the class would achieve an appreciable measure of judicial
economy.
Third, the Allison “incidental” test is an effort to re-write the
requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) in a way that the drafters of Rule 23
implicitly rejected. The Allison court recognized that controlling Fifth
Circuit precedent held that an “inquiry into the manageability or
superiority of a class action and whether common issues predominate
over individual ones has ‘no place in determining whether a class should
be certified under 23(b)(2).’”161 This precedent recognized the rule of
statutory construction that the explicit inclusion of a requirement in one
section of legislation excludes its possibility in other relevant sections.162
This rule should have made it clear that the explicit inclusion of a
predominance and superiority analysis for a 23(b)(3) class implicitly
denies its applicability to either a 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(2) class. However,
the “incidental” test expressly and explicitly seeks to “serve[] essentially
the same functions as the . . . efficiency and manageability standards
mandated in [23](b)(3) class actions.”163 The “incidental test” should be
rejected for this reason alone, as it re-writes the requirements of the
23(b)(2) class to include findings of both superiority and predominance
in order to satisfy 23(b)(2)’s monetary damages “predominance” test.
The Robinson test, rather than re-writing the rules for certifying a
23(b)(2) class, properly depends on the discretion of district courts to
ensure that the textual requirements of 23(b)(2) and the constitutional
requirements of due process are met.
VII. BIFURCATION, PRECEDENT, AND JUDICIAL ECONOMY
In Robinson, the plaintiffs asked the court to certify a bifurcated
proceeding, in which the liability phase of the pattern or practice claim
would be certified under (b)(2) and the damages phase under (b)(3).164
Robinson approved a (b)(2) liability only class after finding that it would
significantly promote judicial economy and was proper under Rule

161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 414 n.8 (quoting Forbush v. J.C. Penney Co., 994 F.2d 1101, 1105 (5th Cir. 1993)).
The formal name for this rule of construction is expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Allison, 151 F.3d at 430.
Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2001).
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23(c)(4).165 In contrast, the Allison court failed to see the relationship
between a disparate treatment and pattern or practice claim.166
Additionally, Allison followed Fifth Circuit precedent holding that the
use of (c)(4) would be an inappropriate circumvention of (b)(3)
certification.167
First, the Robinson decision should be followed instead of Allison
because the former is supported by the plain meaning of (c)(4). Second,
the Robinson court corrects Allison’s misunderstanding of the
relationship between a disparate treatment and pattern or practice claim.
This misunderstanding led the Allison court to believe that judicial
economy would not be served by certifying a liability only (b)(2) class.
A. The Text of Rule 23(c)(4)
Rule 23(c)(4) allows courts to certify “an action . . . with respect to
particular issues” only.168 The policy behind this Rule is to allow courts
to certify distinct issues in order “to reduce the range of disputed issues”
in complex litigation.169 Additionally, this Rule allows courts to “achieve
judicial efficiencies” by reducing the need for a common issue to be
adjudicated more than once through the use of class certification.170
Commentators agree that a class that would fail the common question
requirement of Rule 23 may be creatively sub-classed or the proceedings
may be bifurcated to allow class certification.171 Bifurcated proceedings
are generally limited by a requirement that the use of Rule 23(c)(4) to
“manufacture” predominance be limited only to those common issues
whose resolution will materially advance the adjudication of the entire
litigation.172 This requirement ensures that certification of the issue
specific class “will materially advance [the] disposition of the litigation
as a whole.”173

165. Id. at 168-69.
166. Allison, 151 F.3d at 421.
167. Id.
168. See Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F. 3d 87 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
169. In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 740 (4th Cir. 1989).
170. Cent. Wesleyan Coll. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 6 F.3d 177, 185 (4th Cir. 1993).
171. 32B AM. JUR. 2D. Federal Courts §1994 (2002). (“[T]he court may limit the class to
those members having common questions . . . . Furthermore, questions of liability may be separated
from individual questions of damages . . . .”).
172. See In re Kirschner Med. Corp. Sec. Litig., 139 F.R.D. 74 (D. Md. 1991) (holding that
when the liability issues are common to the class, common questions predominate over individual
ones); 32B AM. JUR. 2D. Federal Courts §1994 (“[I]t is not necessary that the issues considered in
the partial class action predominate when compared with all the issues in the case.”).
173. See In re Tetracycline Cases, 107 F.R.D. 719, 727 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
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B. Plain Meaning: Robinson and Allison/Castano
The plain meaning and substantial weight of authority support the
Robinson court’s use of Rule 23(c)(4) to bifurcate the liability and
damages issues. In contrast, the Allison court’s lack of analysis and
complete reliance upon Castano v. American Tobacco Co., to deny the
use of Rule 23(c)(4) in bifurcating a trial should be rejected.174 The
Castano court ruled, “A district court cannot manufacture predominance
through the nimble use of subdivision (c)(4).”175 The court held that to
use Rule 23(c)(4) to bifurcate issues would “eviscerate the predominance
requirement of Rule 23(b)(3)“ resulting in “automatic certification in
every case where there is a common issue.”176 The Allison court applied
this holding in rejecting plaintiff’s request for a bifurcated Rule 23(b)(3)
trial because it had already found that individualized issues predominated
over common issues and felt it inappropriate to “manufacture”
predominance and allow bifurcation.177
However, the logic of Castano should be distinguished in cases
involving Title VII claims. In Taylor v. D.C. Water & Sewer Authority, a
Title VII class action, the court ruled that Castano was easily
distinguishable from the facts in both the instant case and Allison
because “Castano was a mass torts action involving millions of class
members and wide variations in state law.”178 In Taylor the court
appropriately recognized that while wholesale use of Rule 23(c)(4) in
order to effectively subclass all of the plaintiffs was inappropriate, this
logic did not apply to the simple bifurcation of liability and damage
issues and subsequently certified a bifurcated Title VII class.179
The Robinson court’s decision to bifurcate and certify a liability only
Rule 23(b)(2) class comports with the plain language of Rule 23(c)(4)
allowing issue certification. First, the advisory committee note expressly
endorses the certification of liability issues. It approved of this procedure
by stating that in some cases an “action may retain its ‘class’ character
only through the adjudication of liability to the class.”180 Second, as one
commentator noted, “A plain reading of Rule 23(c)(4) seems to allow
this type of certification . . . [because] the court has the power to sever

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 745 n.21.
Id.
Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 422 (5th Cir. 1998).
Taylor v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 205 F.R.D. 43, 50 (D.D.C. 2002).
Id.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4) advisory committee note.
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any issues that it deems appropriate and try them separately.”181 Third,
another commentator has gone so far as to say that the “drastic step[]” of
dismissing a class should never be taken “whenever the court can
profitably isolate the class issues under Rule 23(c)(4)” and that the Rule
places an affirmative duty upon the court to do so.182 These
considerations strongly militate towards the use of bifurcation under
Rule 23(c)(4) in Title VII cases.
C. Analysis: Judicial Economy
The Robinson court properly recognized that a judicial economy of
scale could be created even if only the liability phase of a Title VII suit
was certified for class treatment. Regardless of the outcome on the
merits, bifurcation creates an economy of scale. This finding is superior
to that of the Allison court, which misunderstood the relationship
between pattern or practice and disparate treatment claims. In fact, while
the claims focus on different theories for proving liability, both require a
prima facie case of discrimination and employer liability.183 Therefore,
while certification should be proper for the damages phase under either
Rule 23(b)(2) or (b)(3),184 the Robinson court recognized that judicial
economies of scale result from resolving liability as a class issue even if
compensatory and punitive damages proceed by individual
adjudication.185
1. Cooper on Title VII: Allison got it all wrong
What is the relationship of disparate treatment to pattern or practice
claims? The answer to this critical question determines whether
bifurcating proceedings creates judicial economy. The Allison court
decided there was “none” and rejected certification of a liability phase
only class. Allison failed to “see how certifying the first stage of the
181. Robert M. Brava-Partain, Due Process, Rule 23, and Hybrid Classes: A Practical
Solution, 53 Hastings L.J. 1359, 1375 (2002).
182. 7B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1790 (2nd ed. 1986).
183. See Craik v. Minn. State Univ. Bd., 731 F. 2d 465, 470 (8th Cir. 1984) (“In pattern or
practice cases, however, the presumption shifts to the employer not only the burden of production,
but also the burden of persuading the trier of fact that it is more likely than not that the employer did
not unlawfully discriminate against the individual.”).
184. See In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 422, 431 (D.C.Pa.1984); In re Agent Orange
Product Liability Litigation, 100 F.R.D. 718, 722 (D.C.N.Y.1983) (need for individual damage
calculations does not make class action certification inappropriate when common questions as to
liability predominate).
185. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 168 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[E]ven
assuming that the remedial stage is ultimately resolved on a non-class basis, the issues and evidence
relevant to these individual adjudications would be substantially narrowed.”).
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pattern or practice claim significantly increases the likelihood that later
certification . . . would be possible.”186 In answering “none,” the Allison
court relied upon a gross misinterpretation of the Supreme Court’s
holding in Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.187 However, by
focusing on the continued claims of plaintiffs for statutorily available
compensatory and punitive damages, the court largely ignored the issue
of individual liability. Without any independent analysis, and relying
entirely upon Cooper, the Allison court decided that except for “a shift of
the burden of proof in the plaintiff’s favor,” there are “no common issues
between the first stage of a pattern or practice claim and an individual
discrimination lawsuit.”188
However, Allison misses Cooper’s point. The Cooper Court found a
significant relationship between the two types of claims precisely
because of the plaintiffs’ shifted burden of proof.189 Cooper held that
neither class representatives for, nor members of, a class are barred by
res judicata from bringing individual discrimination claims after an
adverse finding on the merits against the pattern or practice class
claim.190 The Cooper Court did reason that a “crucial difference” exists
between the two types of claims because they involve different types of
evidence and focus on distinct allegedly discriminatory actions taken by
the employer.191 Therefore, the Cooper Court said, “It could not be more
plain that the rejection of a claim of classwide discrimination does not
warrant the conclusion that no member of the class could have a valid
individual claim.”192 This left the plaintiffs in Cooper free to pursue their
individual disparate treatment claims.
In fact, the Teamsters193 Court anticipated and rejected the Allison
court’s interpretation of Cooper. In interpreting Cooper, the Allison court
reasoned that there were “no common issues between the first stage of a
pattern or practice claim and an individual discrimination lawsuit.”194 In
186. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 421 (5th Cir. 1998).
187. 467 U.S. 867 (1984).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 880 (“The judgment is not, however, dispositive of the individual claims the . . .
petitioners have alleged in their separate action.”).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 876. (“The crucial difference between an individual’s claim of discrimination and a
class action alleging a general pattern or practice of discrimination is manifest. The inquiry
regarding an individual’s claim is the reason for a particular employment decision, while ‘at the
liability stage of a pattern-or-practice trial the focus often will not be on individual hiring decisions,
but on a pattern of discriminatory decision making.”) (citing Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 360 n.46 (1977); see also Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575
n.7 (1978).
192. Cooper, 467 U.S. at 878.
193. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
194. Allison, 151 F.3d at 421.

STAMPS - MACRO FINAL

442

4/30/2003 5:30 PM

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume XVII

Teamsters, the employer, T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc. attempted to employ
similar reasoning. It claimed that the Court’s McDonnell Douglas test
was the “only means of establishing a prima facie case of individual
discrimination.”195 However, the Court rejected this contention and
pointed to explicit language in McDonnell Douglas recognizing that
“‘[the] facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and . . . the prima
facie proof required’” will thus also vary.196 From this, the Teamsters
Court concluded,
The importance of McDonnell Douglas lies, not in its specification of
the discrete elements of proof there required, but in its recognition of
the general principle that any Title VII plaintiff must carry the initial
burden of offering evidence adequate to create an inference that an
employment decision was based on a discriminatory criterion illegal
under the Act.197

Both the McDonnell Douglas test and the liability phase of a pattern or
practice suit create a rebuttable presumption of discrimination under
Title VII. In the language of the Teamsters Court, this rebuttable
presumption, carries “the initial burden . . . adequate to create an
inference” of discrimination and “the finding of a pattern or practice
change[s] the position of the employer to that of a proved wrongdoer.”198
While Allison got off on the wrong track, Robinson corrects and allows
for bifurcation.
2. Robinson on Cooper: Allison got it wrong
Robinson correctly understands the relationship between individual
disparate treatment and pattern or practice class claims and its
ramifications on judicial economy.199 The Robinson court recognized
three possible scenarios resulting from certification of a Rule 23(b)(2)
liability class that would create judicial economy. First, the class might
prevail and establish an illegal and discriminatory pattern or practice.200
This would result in “plaintiff class’s eligibility for appropriate
prospective relief . . . [and] a prima facie case with regard to the remedial

195. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358.
196. Id. at 358 (citing McDonald Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973)).
197. Id. (emphasis added)
198. Id. at 358-59 (“[B]y ‘demonstrating the existence of a discriminatory hiring pattern and
practice’ the plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case of discrimination against the individual class
members.”).
199. The Robinson court did not directly address Allison’s misunderstanding and failure to
achieve the judicial economy of bifurcation. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d
147, 168 (2d Cir. 2001).
200. Id.
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phase of the suit.”201 Second, the case might proceed on a “non-class”
individual basis. In that case, “the issues and evidence relevant to these
individual adjudications would be substantially narrowed,” because of
the establishment of the prima facie case of liability established which
attaches to each individual.202 Third, the defendant might prevail,
“eliminating entirely the need for a remedial stage inquiry.”203
Robinson establishes that bifurcation of the liability and damages
phase achieves judicial economy regardless of the outcome. First, the
establishment of liability in a pattern or practice class would substantially
“reduce the range of issues in dispute” and make certification of a Rule
(b)(2) or (b)(3) damages class more likely.204 Second, in the event that
class certification for the damages phase was inappropriate, the
individual members of the class would not each have to proceed through
the liability phase of a disparate treatment case. Third, the victory of the
defendant would obviate the need for any further proceedings on the
issue of class liability and any individual plaintiffs would be able to bring
their cases.
Other courts have also realized the enormous judicial economy of
scale that is achieved by class treatment of the liability phase. One court
reasoned:
It seems specious and begging the question to say that if these 500 law
suits were brought into a class so that proof on the issues of conspiracy
need be adduced only once and the result then becomes binding on all
500, that thereby the common issue of conspiracy no longer
predominates because from a total time standpoint, cumulatively
individual damage proof will take longer.205

To illustrate, instead of five hundred plaintiffs each having to make a
prima facie disparate treatment case, the matter is greatly simplified by
their ability to make one prima facie “pattern or practice” case to prove
defendant’s liability (or innocence). While the 500:1 ratio above might
be a best case scenario, one study found that “separation of issues,” such
as the bifurcation of liability and damages, “will save, on the average,
about 20 per cent of the time that would be required if these cases were
tried under traditional rules.”206 While bifurcation will not eliminate
201. Id. (quoting Craik v. Minn. State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 470 (8th Cir. 1984)).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Minnesota v. U.S. Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 569 (D.C. Minn.1968).
206. Hans Zeisel & Thomas Callahan, Split Trials and Time Saving: A Statistical Analysis 76
HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1608 (1963). The five hundred plaintiff hypothetical is not far from the truth in
the post-Allison Title VII world. In one case, a court applying the Allison test denied class
certification and was then faced with over 180 individually filed cases when the individual plaintiffs
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individual suits or be appropriate in all circumstances, in applicable cases
it creates an enormous judicial economy of scale and should be received
favorably by courts considering whether or not to actively use Rule
23(c)(4). Therefore, the propriety and availability of bifurcated
proceedings provides another reason to follow Robinson instead of
Allison. However, in addition to the analytical and economic superiority
of Robinson, significant policy and practical considerations also favor its
adoption over Allison.
VIII. POLICY AND PRACTICE: WHILE ALLISON DERAILS, ROBINSON
TRACKS CONGRESS
Legislative intent and the continued threat of negative value suits
should encourage courts to adopt the Robinson balancing test instead of
Allison’s bright line test. As discussed in Part II, Section A, above,
legislative history demonstrates a clear congressional intent to increase
Title VII litigation and combat discrimination.207 Therefore, the threat of
eviscerating effective Title VII enforcement should give courts pause
when evaluating whether to follow Robinson or Allison as precedent.
Allison threatens Title VII enforcement because it de facto denies the use
of class litigation to plaintiffs who then face the continued existence of
the negative value suit dilemma. Robinson stays on track and provides a
legal framework upholding the proven use of class action procedures to
enforce Title VII. Given the negative value suit threat and congressional
intent, courts should actively seek any and all procedural rules and trial
techniques available to prevent potential constitutional concerns that
threaten enforcement of constitutional rights guaranteed by Title VII.
This section lays out the theoretical and empirical case for the continued
certification of Title VII class actions.
Legally, Allison barred the door to the federal judiciary for plaintiff’s
seeking to use Rule 23 to enforce violations of Title VII. By denying
certification under either Rule 23(b)(2) or (b)(3), litigants are left to bring
individual suits. The Allison court was persuaded that attorney’s fees, in
addition to the availability of compensatory and punitive damages,
constituted a sufficient inducement for private Title VII enforcement.208

refused to be denied their day in court. Miller v. Hygrade Food Prods., Inc., 198 F.R.D. 638 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 29, 2001); Personal Interview with Mr. Stephen Whinston, Berger & Montague, P.C., (June
15, 2002).
207. See supra notes 18-24.
208. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 419-20 (5th Cir. 1998).
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However, empirical research on twelve cases denied class certification in
the wake of Allison refutes this assumption.209
Currently, numerous potential plaintiffs face the negative value suit
dilemma following class certification denials based on the Allison test.
Of the twelve cases that directly followed Allison in denying class
certification, only two of the attorneys contacted indicated that individual
suits had continued after the denial of certification.210 The other attorneys
interviewed provided several reasons why individual actions were not
economically feasible. First, fees are only available to the prevailing
party.211 Recently, the Supreme Court has limited the definition of
prevailing party, making it even harder for attorneys to take on feeshifting cases in the hope of being awarded attorney’s fees.212
Second, the costs of the litigation, which must be borne upfront,
usually by the attorney or firm handling the case, can be prohibitive. In
one case where class certification was denied, over one million dollars
was spent simply pursuing certification.213 While individual actions
would be much less expensive, one attorney indicated that cost efficiency
reasons would prevent the use of the necessary “statistical evidence for
individual case[s].”214 Costly statistical analysis is commonly used as
evidence to prove disparities between the average hourly pay of the
protected class of employees and other employees. Such statistical

209. From July 16 to July 18, 2002, the author interviewed plaintiff’s attorneys in the
following twelve cases: Carson v. Giant Food, Inc. 187 F. Supp.2d 462 (D. Md. 2002); Reid v.
Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655 (N.D. Ga. 2001); Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg.,
Inc., 205 F.R.D. 466 (S.D. Ohio 2001); Miller v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 202 F.R.D. 195 (D.
Md. 2001); Riley v. Compucom Sys., Inc., 2000 WL 343189 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2000); Burrell v.
Crown Cent. Petroleum, Inc. 197 F.R.D. 284 (E.D. Tex. 2000); Adams. v. Henderson, 197 F.R.D.
162 (D. Md. 2000); Hoffman v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 191 F.R.D. 530 (S.D. Ohio. 1999); Faulk
v. Home Oil Co., 186 F.R.D. 660 (M.D. Ala. 1999); Zachery v. Texaco Exploration & Prod. Inc.,
185 F.R.D. 230 (W.D. Tex. 1999); Miller v. Hygrade Food Prods. Corp., 198 F.R.D. 638 (E.D. Pa.
2001); Barabin v. Aramark Corp., 210 F.R.D. 152 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
210. Mr. Stephen Whinston, a partner in Berger & Montague, P.C., and counsel of record in
Miller and Aramark, indicated that his firm filed individual complaints for over 180 of the Miller
class members. However, this was a strategic move made in order to gain the attention of the courts.
Under regular circumstances, nearly all of these individual cases would not have been filed. Personal
Interview with Mr. Stephen Whinston, Berger & Montague, P.C., (June 15, 2002). The other
example was in the Reid case. There, the firm informed their clients of the result of a denial of class
certification and proceeded on an individual basis only with those clients who wished to proceed on
an individual basis and had signed retainer agreements. Even then, many named plaintiffs may
choose not to continue on an individual basis. In Reid, over half of the named plaintiffs decided not
to pursue individual actions. Telephone Interview with Ms. Angela Joy Mason, The Cochran Firm
(July 17, 2002).
211. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
212. Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc., v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health and Human Res., 532
U.S. 598, 607 (2001).
213. Bacon, 205 F.R.D. 466. Telephone Interview with Mr. Robert Steinberg, (July 17, 2002).
214. Burrell, 197 F.R.D. 284. Telephone Interview with Mr. Ruben Guttman, (July 17, 2002).
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evidence is often necessary to ferret out workplace discrimination
because of the rarity of direct evidence.215
Third, many individual attorneys and small firms are simply
economically unable to accept fee shifting cases. An individual disparate
treatment case can require from $100,000 to $200,000 in attorney’s fees
and costs alone.216 Additionally, while expert witness and investigation
fees may be recoverable, not all other costs will be.217 This results in
potential plaintiffs and their attorneys having to pay extra expenses in
order to bring a Title VII action. Fourth, “individually bringing cases is
impossible” in many cases simply due to the large number of possible
plaintiffs.218 This is not an economic consideration, but one of sufficient
numbers of attorneys to handle the potential number of cases. Fifth, firm
economics and attorney time are not the only limitation in bringing
individual suits. Many possible plaintiffs might not wish to pursue
individual litigation because of a desire to avoid personal involvement in
litigation, a fear of retaliation, a perception of nominal claim(s), or other
reasons.219 While the 1991 Amendments provided compensatory and
punitive damages in order to encourage and reward private citizens for
enforcing the law, the amount is limited by the employer’s size and could
be as small as $50,000 total for both types of damages.220
One limitation courts have considered in relation to the existence of a
negative value suit is the possibility of a blackmail class.221 However,
this concern should not enter into the court’s analysis and could be
considered an abuse of discretion. After Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,222
it is clear that an inquiry into the merits of the class is not appropriate at
the certification stage. The only proper inquiry is whether or not
215. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999) (Discussing the fact that after nearly forty
years of discrimination lawsuits, facial and direct discrimination in the workplace has become
increasingly rare. However, discrimination in the workplace remains and statistical evidence is used
to prove or disprove the existence of discriminatory employment practices.).
216. Farias v. Instructional Sys., Inc., 259 F.3d 91, 102-03 (2d Cir. 2001) (allowing fees and
costs of $132,193.75); Bishop v. Gainer, 272 F.3d 1009, 1020 (7th Cir. 2001) (allowing fees and
costs of $238,000).
217. Mota v. Univ. of Tex. Houston Health Science Ctr., 261 F.3d 512, 530 (5th Cir. 2001)
(investigation fees recoverable, but costs of videotaped depositions and mediation fees not
recoverable under Title VII).
218. See supra note 207.
219. Telephone Interview with Ms. Angela Joy Mason, The Cochran Firm (July 17, 2002).
220. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000).
221. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1297-99, 1302-03 (7th Cir. 1995) (Judge
Posner described a blackmail class as one where the “sheer magnitude of the risk to which the class
action, in contrast to the individual actions pending or likely, exposes [the defendants]” to legal
blackmail.).
222. 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (holding that any factual inquiry into the merits of a claim, as
opposed to factual inquiry regarding the requirements of Rule 23, is inappropriate when deciding
upon class certification).
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plaintiffs meet the textual requirements of Rule 23. While certification of
a class bent on pursuing an impermissible motive might create
tremendous pressure for the defendant to settle, it should instead seek to
use the procedural weapons available to it that properly address the
merits, i.e. either a 12(b)(6) or summary judgment motion. Either motion
would defeat a class truly without merit. If a claim can survive both of
these motions then any pressure to settle is proper. Defendants feeling
otherwise should take the matter up in Congress, not attempt to persuade
courts to legislate an additional requirement into class certification. On
balance, the possibility of negative value suits precluding the
enforcement of Title VII by private litigation should be a strong
consideration taken into account by courts when deciding class action
certification.
IX. CONCLUSION: ROBINSON IS THE RIGHT TRACK FOR TITLE VII CLASS
LITIGATION
Courts deciding whether to follow the Allison or Robinson line face a
difficult decision. Decisions such as this determine whether the judiciary
is willing to accept its duty to enforce Title VII. For over twenty-five
years, the pattern or practice class has proven itself as an effective
deterrent and motivation for employers to eliminate large-scale
discrimination in the workplace. Courts denying certification for run-ofthe-mill disparate treatment class actions effectively eviscerate Title VII
enforcement. These
courts face two consequences. First, many individual plaintiffs may
be effectively barred from bringing their claims due to the small
recoveries available compared to litigation expenses. Second, where
sufficient recoveries are available or where the discrimination is severe,
court dockets will be clogged with individual claims which could have
been more effectively and economically adjudicated on a class basis.
A thorough comparison of the Robinson and Allison decisions
demonstrates that effective Title VII enforcement is threatened by the
over-inclusive bright-line “incidental” test of monetary predominance
advocated by Allison. The Allison test de facto denies the utilization of
Rule 23(b)(2) class actions to plaintiffs that seek compensatory and
punitive damages provided by Title VII. In the name of preventing
unmanageable classes which pose a constitutional risk to due process, the
test departs from the advisory committee’s suggestion for directly
comparing the relationship between the equitable and monetary relief
requested by the class. This departure creates an over-inclusive test
which denies legitimate non-predominant monetary claims class
certification. In effect, the Allison test requires putative Rule 23(b)(2)
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classes to meet the superiority and predominance requirements of a Rule
23(b)(3) class. This interpretation of Rule 23(b)(2) represents a radical
departure from its creation as a procedure intended to facilitate civil
rights enforcement. To add insult to textual injury, Allison also holds that
putative classes seeking monetary damages will usually fail the
superiority and predominance requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) due to
unmanageable class sizes and the predominance of individual issues in
determining damages. Allison further shuts the door of the judiciary to
Title VII class litigation by denying the use of bifurcated liability and
damages proceedings due to the risk of violating the Seventh
Amendment.
In stark contrast, the Robinson court allows Title VII class litigation
to get back on track and into the courts. Rather than abdicate its duty to
adjudicate Title VII claims,
The Robinson court tackles the jurisprudential and constitutional
concerns of Allison head on. First, the Robinson court fashioned a Rule
23(b)(2) test of monetary predominance that directly compares the
relationship between the equitable and monetary relief requested.
Robinson provides courts with an objective, narrowly-tailored test which
can weed out monetary claims that “predominate” over equitable relief
without being over-inclusive and precluding non-predominating, yet still
substantial, monetary relief. The balancing test also preserves the
discretion of the district court to make class certification decisions
without undue appellate second-guessing. Second, Robinson approves
the use of bifurcated proceedings to adjudicate the issue of Title VII
liability. This decision corrects Allison’s legal derailment and
misinterpretation about the relationship between pattern or practice and
individual disparate treatment claims. Bifurcation also allows an overworked judiciary to achieve a significant economy of scale in
adjudicating Title VII claims. Finally, Robinson defends the historic role
of Rule 23(b)(2) class actions in enforcing Title VII. This decision
reflects proper deference to congressional intent and allows
discrimination victims to avail themselves of class litigation in order to
avoid the negative value suit dilemma.
The current failure of the judiciary to follow Robinson’s superior
legal analysis will result in either a congressional override statue or the
resolution of the dispute by the Supreme Court. Although the Supreme
Court refused to grant certiorari on Robinson to resolve the split with
Allison, they will receive another opportunity when the Ninth Circuit reissues its opinion on Molski v. Gleich.223 Regardless of Molski’s decision

223. 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 2055 (9th Cir. Feb. 6, 2003).
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on whether to follow Allison or Robinson, the wide divide between the
two monetary predominance tests demands resolution. Therefore, the
Supreme Court should grant certiorari in Molski. Furthermore, given the
important jurisprudential and policy reasons articulated in this Comment,
the Supreme Court should follow the Robinson court’s track and let
Allison’s precedential value derail.
W. Lyle Stamps

